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Creating More Problems than Solutions: Why It’s Time for the Wire Act to Retire
Sarah E. Robertson*
Introduction
The housewife, the factory worker, and the businessman will tell you that they are
against such things as narcotics, bootlegging, prostitution, gang murders, the
corruption of public officials and police, and the bribery of college athletes. And
yet this is where their money goes.1
The gambling industry has been a thorn in the United States’ side since its inception, and

despite numerous attempts by the federal government to determine whether gambling and sports
betting should be legal and who should control it, the government has yet to make up its mind on
the subject. In 1961, the Kennedy administration thought it had found a way to finally put an end
to mobs and organized crime, when Congress passed the Wire Act of 1961, which sought to cut
off those criminal enterprises’ access to revenue by making sports betting via “wire
communication” illegal.2
However, in 2022, one cannot watch a sporting event without a constant influx of sports
betting commercials.3 Companies such as FanDuel and BetMGM dominate the now legal sports
betting space and have made it into a multi-billion-dollar industry. In New Jersey alone, close to
$1.35 billion was placed in bets in February 2022.4 Yet, the archaic Wire Act still makes it a federal
crime for persons to be engaged in the business of betting or wagering. 5 It is clear that the Wire

*J.D. Candidate, 2022, Seton Hall University School of Law; B.A., 2019, Hamilton College.
1 Robert F. Kennedy, 1961.
2 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084.; Brett Smiley, The Wire Act of 1961: The Time that RFK sent JFK a Letter about Sports Betting,
SPORTS H ANDLE (Mar. 5, 2018), https://sportshandle.com/the-wire-act-of-1961-rfk-jfk-sports-betting/.
3 Avi Salzman, New Data Show Enormous Growth Rate in Gambling Ads, B ARRON’S (Feb. 10, 2022, 12:25 PM)
https://www.barrons.com/articles/new-data-show-enormous-growth-rate-in-gambling-ads-51644513956.
It
is
estimated that sports betting companies spent $725 million on advertising alone in 2021. Compared to 2020, where
companies only spent $292 million. Now, sports betting sites spend three times as much on ads as cereal companies
do. This is not to consider the impact on people who watch those sport ing events, or how such content affects children
or teenagers about to become of legal betting age. While this paper cannot properly dive into such an interesting
subject, it begs the question of whether Robert Kennedy might have been correct about some of his ideas.
4 New Jersey Gambling Revenue: America’s #1 Sports Betting Market , SPORTS B ETTING DIMES (Mar. 1, 2022)
https://www.sportsbettingdime.com/new-jersey/sports-betting-revenue/ (last visited May 16, 2022).
5 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084.
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Act was passed at a specific time for a specific reason – to halt the spread and funding of organized
crime. Robert F. Kennedy and Congress chose to regulate sports betting to achieve this goal.
Although the success of these efforts is debatable, what is clear is that the 60-year-old Wire Act
has outlived its usefulness.
This paper argues for the modernization of the federal sports betting regulatory scheme,
which can only be achieved through the repeal of the Wire Act, and the transfer of power to
regulate sports betting and gaming to state governments. The federal government is ill-equipped
to control the expansion of sports betting across the country and the Wire Act cannot adapt to the
growth of mobile sports betting. Additionally, the federal government’s past efforts have been
inconsistent and incomplete. A 2011 Department of Justice (“DOJ”) Opinion stated that the Wire
Act only applied to “sports-related gambling activities” because legislative history lacked any
intention to provide the government with the ability to prosecute non-sports gaming activities.6
However, a 2018 DOJ Opinion reversed its previous opinion and concluded that, in fact, the Wire
Act implicated all forms of Internet gaming, and not just sports betting. 7 These conflicting opinions
have shown the federal government’s lack of a uniform policy about sports betting. With the way
the current Wire Act stands, state governments, sports betting companies, and even patrons
themselves are open to liability should the DOJ choose to prosecute violations of the Wire Act.8
States and gaming companies should take a more aggressive approach to persuad e Congress to
repeal the Wire Act, and pass power to states if it wants to avoid such exposure.

Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling, 35 Op. O.L.C. 134 (Sep. 20, 2011) (“Whether the Wire Act
Applies”), available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/2011-09-20-wire-act-non-sports-gambling/download;
Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non -Sports Gambling, 42 Op. O.L.C. 1 (Nov. 2, 2018)
(“Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies”), available at https://www.justice.gov/olc/file/1121531/download.
7 Id.
8 Brandon P. Rainey, Note, The Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006: Legislative Problems and
Solutions, 35 J. Legis. 147, 157 (2009) (“Under the Wire Act, gambling businesses which make gambling over wires
their day-to-day occupation may be prosecuted, but individual gamblers cannot be.”).
6
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Part II of this paper will begin with the history of the Wire Act of 1961, the various
prosecutions of the 1990s, the 2011 and 2018 Opinion’s from the Office of Legislative Affairs
(“OLA”) and DOJ, the most recent case filed, New Hampshire Lottery Commission v. Rosen.9 Part
III of this paper will focus on the failures of the Wire Act and the federal governments’
ambivalence towards the idea of properly regulating sports betting, and will argue that it is essential
the Wire Act is replaced and regulatory power is returned to the states. Such change is necessary
because (1) the Act’s outdated language does not address changing technology used by sports
betting companies; and (2) the current federal regulatory scheme, which includes the Unlawful
Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of 2006 (UIGEA), cannot appropriately regulate the gaming
industry.
II.

The Wire Act of 1961 and Proceeding Federal Attempts to Control Sports Betting
The Wire Act was enacted in 1961 as a part of the campaign by then Attorney General

Robert F. Kennedy to crack down on illegal sports gambling operations and racketeering which
were funding mob organizations.10 Kennedy believed that organized crime was more of a threat to
the United States than Communist aggression, an opinion he developed whole serving on the U.S.
Senate’s McClennan Committee in 1957.11 The McClennan Committee, named after Senator John
L. McClennan of Arkansas, was formed to investigate union corruption, and was colloquially
named the “Rackets Committee” as it probed labor and management corruption. 12 The Committee
exposed over 49 mobsters that were associated with the Teamsters; 141 Teamsters officers tied to
improper or criminal activities (71 of whom invoked their Fifth Amendment rights to avoid

New Hampshire Lottery Comm’n v. Barr 386 F. Supp. 3d 132 (D.N.H. 2019).
Hearings Before the Senate Judiciary Committee on the Attorney General's Program to Curb Organized Crime and
Racketeering, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., 4 (1961) (statement of Robert F. Kennedy, Att’y Gen. of the United States)
(“Organized crime is nourished by a number of activities, but the primary source of its growth is illicit gambling.”)
11 Id.
12 Id.
9

10
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answering questions).13 It is estimated that by the mid-twentieth century, the mafia had close to
5,000 members across the United States. 14
In fact, in 1960, Kennedy wrote a book on the subject entitled, The Enemy Within,
documenting his crusade against Jimmy Hoffa and his involvement with corrupt labor unions.15
After his appointment to the Attorney General’s office, Robert Kennedy decided to use the powers
of the DOJ to defeat Jimmy Hoffa and mob families across the country. 16 Kennedy proposed
several laws to Congress, including Senate Bill 1656, also known as the Wire Act. 17 This was the
first time a federal statute targeted an entire organized crime unit instead of just prosecuting
individuals.18 The purpose of this law was to control the mob problem in the United States by
attacking a source of funding for mob organizations, part of which was coming from underground
betting organizations operated through telegraphs and partially telephones. 19
Congress passed the bill and John F. Kennedy signed it into law on September 13, 1961.20
The Wire Act provides, in relevant part:
Whoever being engaged in the business of betting or wagering knowingly uses a
wire communication facility for the transmission in interstate or foreign commerce
of bets or wagers or information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers on any
sporting event or contest, or for the transmission of a wire communication which
entitles the recipient to receive money or credit as a result of bets or wagers, or for
information assisting in the placing of bets or wagers, shall be fined under this title
or imprisoned not more than two years, or both. 21

Jeff Burbank, Robert F. Kennedy’s Crusade Against the Mob, THE M OB M USEUM: ROBERT F. KENNEDY’S CRUSADE
AGAINST THE M OB: PART 1 (June 6, 2018), https://themobmuseum.org/blog/robert-f-kennedys-crusade-mob/.
14 Becky Little, How Bobby Kennedy Started the War on Gangs, H ISTORY: H ISTORY STORIES (Feb. 1, 2018),
https://www.history.com/news/robert-kennedy-started-the-war-on-mafia-gangs.
15 Robert F. Kennedy, The Enemy Within (1960).
16 Little, supra note 13.
17 David G. Schwartz, Not Undertaking the Almost-Impossible Task: The 1961’s Wire Act’s Development, Initial
Applications, and Ultimate Purpose, 14(7) GAMING L. REV. AND ECON. 533, 553 (2010).
18 Burbank, supra note 12.
19 Baxter Geddie, Note, A Law of Confusion: Conflicting Interpretations of the Wire Act Prove the Need for Reform,
24 Gaming L. Rev. 392, 393 (2020).
20 Id.
21 18 U.S.C.A. § 1084.
13
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A crime under the Wire Act consists of three elements: First, persons engaged in the
business of betting or wagering; second, use of a wire communication facility; and third, the
transmission of wagering on sports events or horse racing. 22 While these elements appear
straightforward, law enforcement agencies struggled to enforce the Wire Act.23 Specifically, as
technology changed from telephones and telegraphs to modern satellite technology, prosecutors
were unclear as to whether the Wire Act applied to those new forms of communication.24
Some of these issues were brought to light in the late 1990s when the DOJ attempted to
prosecute online betting sites that had been deliberately based overseas to avoid prosecution under
the Wire Act.25 The DOJ indicted operators of six online betting sites: Island Casino and Real
Casino of Curacao, SDB Global and Real Casino of Costa Rica, and Winner’s Way and World
Sports Exchange of Antigua.26 Three Defendants surrendered themselves because they were in the
United States at the time of indictment, however, the others remained outside of the United States
to avoid being arrested.27 Because their wagering sites were technically legal in foreign countries,
these Defendants had no imminent reason to return to the United States. Of the 10 individuals
charged at these betting sites, three pled guilty and seven remained outside of the U.S., successfully
avoiding prosecution.28 However, one of the Defendants, the president of World Sports Exchange

22

Robin
Harrison-Millan, Murky
Motivations, IGAMING BUSINESS NORTH
AMERICA (Dec.
6,
2019), https://www.igbnorthamerica.com/murky-motivations/ (last visited May 16, 2022) (comparing the original
motivations for the Wire Act and the DOJ’s motivation to reinterpret the Act. Concluding that the DOJ’s motivations
cannot be traced to social responsibility concerns or commercial interests like in 1960. Thus, due to the DOJ’s futile
efforts, it is inevitable that the DOJ’s opinions will end up in front of the Supreme Court).
23 Id.
24 Id.
25 United States v. Cohen, 260 F.3d 68, 76 (2d Cir. 2001).
26 Schwartz, supra note 16, at 538.
27 Id.
28 Id.
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Jay Cohen decided it was time to clear his name and return to the United States, believing that he
could successfully prove he was not guilty of violating the Wire Act.29
Upon Cohen’s return, he was indicted, and his prosecution became a test case to determine
if the Wire Act could be used against the operation of online sportsbooks. 30 During the trial, the
prosecution argued that although these sites were based and licensed to run books in Antigua, they
also used a phone system to accept bets from Americans. 31 Acceptance of bets was a direct
violation of the Wire Act because it used an illegal “wire communication facility” to transmit
sports bets, and, thus, it did not matter where the company was technically located and licensed.32
Cohen’s counsel, despite conceding that World Sports Exchange had previously accepted bets
from undercover agents in the United States, attempted to argue that Cohen himself had not
accepted any of these bets and thus had not violated the Wire Act. 33 The jury was unpersuaded by
Cohen’s argument and found him guilty; Cohen was then sentenced to eighteen months in federal
prison.34
Although Cohen settled the dispute about the Wire Act’s application to Internet sports
betting, the court did not consider whether the Wire Act applied to other types of Internet gaming,
such as slots, blackjack, and roulette. The Fifth Circuit addressed the subject head on when the
court consolidated 33 cases into In re MasterCard Intern. Inc.35 In these cases, a patron entered
their credit card number into an online gaming site, lost, and then sought to have their money
returned.36 Plaintiffs’ counsel argued that credit card companies, through the acceptance of a

29

Id. at 539.
Id.
31 Id.
32 Id.
33 Id.
34 Cohen, 260 F.3d at 76. See Net Gaming Operator Cohen Freed from Prison, LAS VEGAS SUN (Mar. 23, 2004),
https://m.lasvegassun.com/news/2004/mar/23/net-gaming-operator-cohen-freed-from-prison/.
35 In re MasterCard Intern. Inc., 313 F.3d 257, 260–61 (5th Cir. 2002).
36 Id.
30
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payment to a gaming site, were involved in racketeering activities with the online casino operators
and had collected unlawful debt.37 “But for” the online site’s acceptance of the credit card payment,
the patron would have never gambled in the first place. 38 The Fifth Circuit held that the business
relationship between the online sites and the credit card companies was not a corrupt sportsbook
operation, but instead a contractual business relationship. 39 Additionally, the court held that the
Wire Act applied only to sports betting and that the games of chance wagered on by Plaintiff’s
were not clearly sports betting, meaning the Wire Act was inapplicable.40
Following Cohen and In re MasterCard Intern. Inc, courts were still split on how to apply
the Wire Act to sports betting and whether the DOJ could use the Wire Act to prosecute individuals
and online gaming sites. 41 That dispute continued by the virtue of conflicting DOJ opinions in
2011 and 2018.
A. The 2011 DOJ Opinion
In 2009, a handful of states had preliminary plans to sell lottery tickets within its state
borders through an Internet platform that used out-of-state transaction processors.42 This reflected
the shift across the country to move casino games and lotteries online as a way to extend its reach
to customers.43 At the time, New York was finalizing its lottery program to use a new computer
system to control the sale of lottery tickets. 44 While all transaction data would be routed through

37

Id.
In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., Internet Gambling Litig., 132 F. Supp. 2d 468 (E.D. La. 2001), aff'd sub nom. In re
MasterCard Int'l Inc., 313 F.3d 257 (5th Cir. 2002).
39 In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 487.
40 Id.
41 See also United States v. Lombardo, 639 F. Supp. 2d 1271, 1275 (D. Utah 2007) (holding the Defendants violated
the Wire Act when a company served as a middleman between bettors and financial institution’s when it “misclassified
the charge” to hide their gambling nature, thus duping banks into distributing funds).
42 Anthony Cabot, Federal Wire Act Should Adjust to State-Regulated Sports Wagering, Not the Other Way Around:
A Proposal for Change, 25 Gaming L. Rev. 109, 113 (2021).
43 Id.
44 See Whether Proposals by Illinois and New York to Use the Internet and Out -of-State Transaction Processors to
Sell Lottery Tickets to In-State Adults Violate the Wire Act, 35 Op. O.L.C. (Sep. 20, 2011) (“Whether Proposals by
Illinois
and
New
York
Violate
the
Wire
Act”),
available
at
38
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the customer’s location in New York, the lottery’s data center would be located in New York and
Texas, with networks controlled in Maryland and Nevada. 45 Illinois, while still creating a pilot
program, had plans to sell lottery tickets solely over the Internet to customers located within the
State of Illinois.46 However, at times, packets of data could be intermediately routed across state
lines over the Internet.47 In advance of launching these programs, New York and Illinois wrote to
the DOJ asking for guidance as to whether it could implement online lottery sales without the fear
of government prosecution under the Wire Act. 48 Both states believed that its respective programs
were entirely intra-state, and thus would not implicate the Wire Act because neither program
involved a wire communication about sports wagering that crossed state lines.49 The DOJ did not
respond to its inquiries.50
Almost two years later, Senator Harry Reid from the State of Nevada and Senator Jon Kyl
from the State of Arizona wrote to the Attorney General Eric Holder and again requested that the
DOJ clarify its stance on the scope of the Wire Act as it applied to online gaming.51 The letter
specifically blamed the lack of action by the DOJ for the growing belief that online gaming did
not violate federal law.52 The letter incorporated the prior memorandums from New York and
Illinois regarding state lotteries, and argued that the DOJ had given these states “effective consent”

https://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/olc/opinions/2011/09/31/state-lotteries-opinion.pdf (citing Letter for Portia
Roberson, Director, Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, from William J. Mu rray, Deputy Director and General
Counsel, New York Lottery (Dec. 4, 2009)).
45 Id.
46 See Whether Proposals by Illinois and New York Violate the Wire Act at 1 (citing Letter for Eric H. Holder, Jr.,
Attorney General of the United States, from Pat Quinn, Governor, State of Illinois (Dec. 11, 2009)).
47 Id. at 2.
48 Id.
49 Id.
50 Cabot, supra note 41, at 114.
51 See Letter for Eric Holder, Attorney General of the United States, from Harry Reid, Senator, State of Nevada, and
Jon
Kyl,
Senator,
State
of
Arizona
(July
14,
2011), https://media.lasvegassun.com/media/pdfs/blogs/documents/2011/07/16/reid -kyl-letter-to-holder.pdf.
52 Id.
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to implement Internet gaming because the DOJ had neither approved nor rejected those
proposals.53
In response, the DOJ issued its opinion on the topic on September 20, 2011, concluding
that the Wire Act applied only to “sports-related gambling activities.”54 The DOJ’s Opinion was
based on the drafting of the statute and legislative history. The draft language for 1084(a) would
have imposed criminal liability on any person using a wire communication “for the transmission
in interstate or foreign commerce of bets or wagers, or information assisting in the placing of bets
or wagers, on any sporting event or contest … ”55 However, the commas did not make it into the
final version of the Act, which according to the DOJ, completely changed the meaning of the Wire
Act, and thus its provisions applied only to sports gaming.56 In addition to the drafting change,
there was no legislative history that led the DOJ to believe Congress wanted the Wire Act apply
to anything other than sports gambling.57 Even the House Judiciary Committee chairman in 1960
specifically stated during debate on the bill that the Wire Act involves “transmission of wagers or
bets and layoffs on horse racing and other sporting events.”58 Relying on this guidance, many states
began using out of state servers to store data in a similar fashion to New York and Illinois, and
online gambling exploded across the United States.59
Although the applicability of the Wire Act to non-sports betting activities now seemed
settled, the landscape of sports betting itself was about to change. In 1992, Congress passed The

53

Id.
Whether the Wire Act Applies to Non-Sports Gambling at 135.
55 Id.
56 Id.
57 Id.
58 In re MasterCard Int'l Inc., 132 F. Supp. 2d at 480 (quoting 107 Cong. Rec. 16533 (Aug. 21, 1961)) (emphasis
added).
59 Mark Hichar & Erica Okerberg, New Hampshire Lottery Strikes Back: The U.S. District Court Holds That the Wire
Act Applies Only to Sports Betting, 23(8) GAMING L. REV. 594 (2019). By 2017, six states had made online lottery
games available: Illinois, Georgia, Michigan, Kentucky, New Hampshire, and Pennsylvania. See LINEUPS,
https://www.lineups.com/betting/online-lottery/ (last visited May 16, 2022).
54
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Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act, which made it unlawful for states to operate a
sports betting regulatory scheme. PASPA stated, in relevant part:
It shall be unlawful for [either] . . . a governmental entity . . . or a person to sponsor,
operate, advertise, or promote, pursuant to the law or compact of a governmental
entity, a lottery, sweepstakes, or other betting, gambling, or wagering scheme
based, directly or indirectly (through the use of geographical references or
otherwise), on one or more competitive games in which amateur or professional
athletes participate, or are intended to participate, or on one or more performances
of such athletes in such games.60
When passed, the law included provisions that awarded special protections to certain states.
Specifically, a grandfather provision was included for Nevada sportsbooks, the limited Oregon
sports lottery, the limited Delaware sports lottery, and the limited sports pool betting in Montana
to continue its sports betting practices.61 Additionally, PASPA allowed for a one-year window for
New Jersey to legalize sports betting, or else the state was also subject to PASPA prohibitions.62
In 2012 however, PASPA was challenged on constitutional grounds.63 In 2018, the
Supreme Court held in Murphy v. NCAA that PASPA violated the anti-commandeering principle
of the Tenth Amendment, and, thus, was unconstitutional.64 Simply put, the anti-commandeering
doctrine is the “decision to withhold from Congress the power to issue orders” directly to the
States.65 When Congress forced states to prohibit sports gambling, regardless of its desire to allow
sports betting, it was an overreach and in direct conflict with states’ sovereignty to enact or modify
its own laws.66 Murphy immediately opened the door to the expansion of sports betting and raised
serious questions about the scope of federal and state regulation of the gaming industry.

60

28 U.S.C. § 3702 (2006).
Id.
62 However, New Jersey did not take advantage of the one-year provision; despite efforts by the state legislature. See
Eric Meer, Note, The Professional and Amateur Sports Protection Act (PASPA): A Bad Bet for the States, 2(2) UNLV
GAMING L.J. 281, 287 (2011).
63 NCAA v. Christie, 926 F. Supp. 2d 551, 554 (D.N.J. 2013).
64 Murphy v. NCAA, 138 U.S. 1461, 1473 (2018).
65 Id. at 1475.
66 Id.
61
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B. The 2018 DOJ Opinion
Following Murphy, some states began to draft regulatory schemes to expand sports betting
within its boundaries. At the same time, the federal government revisited the 2011 DOJ Opinion’s
interpretation of the Wire Act.67 During Murphy, the Trump administration supported sports
leagues via amicus briefs.68 These briefs evidenced the support of the sports leagues that argued
for PASPA’s constitutionality. Although the inner-workings of the decision to revisit the 2011
DOJ Opinion have not been made public, the logical conclusion is that the DOJ intended to
counter-act Murphy and halt states from implementing sports betting.
Indeed, in November 2018, the DOJ reversed its interpretation of the Wire Act and as set
out in its 2011 Opinion. This new memorandum stated that first, the phrase “on any sporting event
or contest” in the Wire Act modified only the prohibition on transmitting “information assisting in
the placing of bets or wagers.”69 Second, the DOJ found the Wire Act was unambiguous on its
face, so looking through legislative history was completely unnecessary. 70 The DOJ concluded
that the Wire Act implicated all forms of Internet gambling, and is not limited to sports betting.71
On January 15, 2019, the U.D. Deputy Attorney General Rod Rosenstein issued a
memorandum directing the DOJ’s attorneys and FBI agents to delay applying the 2018 DOJ
Opinion for 90 days.72 This period was later extended another 60 days, to June 14, 2019. 73 This
period was again extended for a third time on December 31, 2019, for 60 days or after the final
decision of a then-pending matter in the Federal District Court, New Hampshire v. Rosen,

67

Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies at 13.
Brief for Respondents, Christie v. NCAA, 138 U.S. 1461 (2017) (Nos. 16-476, 16-477) 2017 WL 4805228.
69 Reconsidering Whether the Wire Act Applies at 12.
70 Id. at 13-14.
71 Id. at 17-18.
72 Applicability of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, to Non-Sports Gambling, Rod. J. Rosenstein (Jan 15, 2019).
73 Additional Directive Regarding the Applicability of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, to Non -Sports Gambling, Rod.
J. Rosenstein (Feb. 28, 2019).
68
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whichever is later.74 The 2018 Opinion and the subsequent stay from the DOJ placed states, who
had relied on the 2011 Opinion to launch lotteries, in limbo when determining how to regulate
sports betting and lotteries.
In 2019, the New Hampshire Lottery Commission (“NHLC”) and its iLottery vendor,
NewPollard Interactive (“NewPollard”), sued the DOJ seeking a declaration that the Wire Act was
limited to sports betting.75 Plaintiffs feared that after the 2018 DOJ opinion, the government would
prosecute the state for its online lottery services, which provided the state with most of its yearly
revenue.76 The District Court for the District of New Hampshire granted summary judgement in
favor of the NHLC.77 First, the court found that the NHLC faced imminent threat of prosecution
under the 2018 DOJ Opinion because the 2018 DOJ Opinion did not expressly conclude that states
would be exempt from prosecution if it continued to operate online lottery platforms.78 Next, when
examining whether the Wire Act applied to lotteries, the court found the statutory language
ambiguous and therefore, turned to the legislative history of the Wire Act, finding no reason why
Congress would have wanted to prohibit the transmission of all bets and wagers, but bar
information for the sole purpose of placing bets or wagers on sporting events. 79 Regarding the
second clause of the Wire Act, the court described DOJ’s 2018 Opinion’s view on the subject as

74

Updated Directive Regarding the Applicability of the Wire Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1084, to Non -Sports Gambling, Jeff
Rosen (June 12, 2019); New Hampshire Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 62 (1st Cir. Jan. 20, 2021).
75 New Hampshire Lottery Comm’n, at 132.
76 Id. at 139. NHLC was joined in amici by New Jersey, Pennsylvania, and the Michigan Bureau of State Lottery.
Michigan was also supported by the “Kentucky Lottery Corporation, the Tennessee Education Lottery Corporation,
the Virginia Lottery, the Rhode Island Lottery, the Colorado State Lottery Division, the North Carolina Education
Lottery, the State of Delaware, the State of Idaho, the State of Vermont, the State of Mississippi, the State of Alaska,
and the District of Columbia. Id.
77 Id.
78 Id. at 141-42.
79 New Hampshire Lottery Comm’n v. Barr, 386 F. Supp. 3d 132, 150-52 (D.N.H. 2019). The court here looked to the
different proposed schools of thought on statutory interpretation. The government proposed a “last-antecedent” rule,
while the NHLC proposed the “series-qualifier” rule. While avoiding the intricacies of both rules, the court ultimately
decided that both proposed rules were inapplicable, because the statute lacked the proper punctuation to allow either
rule to carry the day.
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“bizarre” because its interpretation of the first clause would authorize the transmission of
information that facilitates non-sports-related gambling, while the second clause would
criminalize transmissions that would enable a person to receive payment for those transactions.80
Additionally within the legislative history, the court found that the Senate Judiciary Committee
did not mention an intention to expand the Wire Act beyond sports betting. 81
On January 20, 2021, the First Circuit affirmed the District Court’s decision.82 The First
Circuit focused on the 2018 DOJ’s “odd and unharmonious” attempted interpretation of the Wire
Act, which would have created conflicting views of Internet gaming, versus sports betting across
the country.83 Because NewPollard operates in other jurisdictions, the decision by the First Circuit
impacted states across the country, and once again the Wire Act was minimized to a small subset
of online gambling. Since New Hampshire Lottery Commission, the Biden administration allowed
the 150-day period to appeal the case to expire, outwardly declining to appeal the case to the
Supreme Court.84 With this denial, the DOJ has effectively returned to its 2011 Opinion.85
This lack of action by the federal government has set the tone of current policy towards the
betting industry, a lassie-faire approach that does a disservice to all parties involved. Although the
DOJ currently has no plans to seek judicial interpretations of the Wire Act or to prosecute
individuals under the Act, this could change. Additionally, the lack of action leaves the decision
up to the DOJ and whether it chooses to use the Wire Act to bring charges against states and

80

Id. at 152.
Id. at 156.
82 New Hampshire Lottery Comm’n v. Rosen, 986 F.3d 38, 62 (1st Cir. Jan. 20, 2021).
83 Id. at 61.
84 Charlie Passut, Online Poker on Precipice of Transformational Change Should DOJ Take Actions, POKER I NDUSTRY
PROS (Jun. 23, 2021), https://pokerindustrypro.com/news/article/215755-after-doj-declines-appeal-states-ask-bidendoj-clarify-wire.
85 Gregory A. Brower, DOJ Throws in the Towel on Wire Act Interpretation, but Congressional Action May Loom,
WASHING LEGAL FOUNDATION (Jul. 12, 2021), https://www.wlf.org/2021/07/12/wlf-legal-pulse/doj-throws-in-thetowel-on-wire-act-interpretation-but-congressional-action-may-loom/.
81
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operators, despite the Act’s inconsideration of modern betting technology and third-party
intermediary payment methods.
On June 18, 2021, twenty-five State Attorneys General wrote a letter to U.S. Attorney
General Merrick Garland urging the DOJ to officially abandon the 2018 DOJ Opinion.86 The states
argued that many state governments relied on the 2011 DOJ Opinion and allowed other forms of
gaming, such as lotteries, to proceed.87 Thus, it was vital for states to get clarity on the subject
without having to file suit in every single federal jurisdiction and to continue these gaming and
lottery programs without the fear of federal prosecution. 88 To this day the letter remains
unanswered. The Biden administration has refused to become involved in the matter, and it is
unlikely this policy will change. While it is promising that these members of Congress recognize
the need to amend the Wire Act to allow interstate gambling, these actions are not enough. 89 The
lack of involvement from the Biden administration, specifically the DOJ, is exactly why Congress
should work independently to repeal the Wire Act and move the regulation of gaming directly to
state control.
III.

Repeal of the Wire Act
The original purpose of the Wire Act was to stop mob activity throughout the United States

by eliminating funding organized crime units obtained from operating sportsbooks. However, the
need to halt organized crime today has little to do with the legalized sports betting industry.90
Today, the Wire Act is a fossil in the federal regulatory scheme. The Act is not equipped to oversee
the regulation of the newly legalized sports betting market because of advancing technology for
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operators and regulators. Furthermore, the federal government is also inadequate to regulate such
a fast-growing industry due to its own incoherent approach to the Wire Act. The Wire Act today
creates more problems than solutions and should be repealed so that states can regulate sports
betting autonomously.
This section argues that the Wire Act must be repealed, and regulatory power handed to
the states. First, the Wire Act does not address the ever-changing modern technology used by
sports betting companies, and the conflicting opinions of the federal government as to what the
Wire Act actually means and what parties it controls. Second, the UIGEA, which some have argued
is a proper replacement for the Wire Act, is not a strong enough statute to fully deal with the
gaming industry. Third, this section will explore how the Wire Act in its current version exposes
states and sports betting companies to liability.
A. Inapplicability to Modern Technology and Inconsistent Federal Government Approach
It is undisputed that the Wire Act was enacted in 1961 to curb organized crime, however,
it is not clear how the Act should be applied to today’s modern gambling technology. The failure
to consider advancements in technology and failure to create a comprehensive policy are reasons
the Wire Act should be repealed.
In 2021, online sports betting more than doubled, with 12% of adults stating they had
placed a bet on sports more than once a week, compared to 5% the year before.91 The total handle
placed in 2021 equaled $52.7 billion.92 By October of 2021, mobile sports betting made up 84%
of all bets made, compared to 14% of bets coming from retail locations. 93 The sports betting
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industry has all but moved to online betting platforms, yet the federal government is stuck in a
time of telegraphs and wire communications.
In recent history, there have been some attempts by both Congress and sports leagues to
modernize and adopt a different approach to regulate the gaming and sports betting industry. On
September 27, 2018, Congress invited members of the gaming industry to a House Judiciary
subcommittee hearing entitled “Post-PASPA: An Examination of Sports Betting in America.” 94
The National Football League (“NFL”) argued for uniform standards for states who want to
legalize sports betting, and not for an expansion of federal regulation. 95 Following the
congressional hearing, Senators Chuck Schumer and Orrin Hatch introduced the Sports Wagering
Market Integrity Act of 2018, which would have implemented customer protecting safety
measures, preserved the integrity of sports, and ensured the propriety of the sports wagering
market.96 This bill directly addressed the modern technology of the sports betting industry and
created measures that states would have to abide by when implementing sports betting. However,
due to varying congressional roadblocks and Senator Hatch’s retirement, the bill never made it out
of committee.97 No vote was ever taken, so the bill was never passed. However, this attempt shows
at least some desire by Congress and private organizations to have the federal government address
gambling policies on the federal level.
With more people placing sports bets than ever before, it is clear this is a drastic evolution
from the sports betting that existed in 1961. While the federal government has the power to regulate
interstate commerce through federal legislation that provides guidance and structure, repealing the
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Wire Act would not completely abolish all federal gaming laws. Congress is free to create more
legislation that properly regulates the gaming industry in the twenty-first century, but at this
moment, repealing the Wire Act and transferring power to the states is the next solution. Only
when the Wire Act is repealed can state governments properly regulate sports betting and avoid
the risk of prosecution under the Wire Act.
In addition to the outdated nature of the Wire Act, the conflicting DOJ opinions show that
the federal government does not fully understand how the Wire Act regulates modern sports
betting. Sixty-one years after the Wire Act was passed and there is no uniform interpretation of
the Act. Instead of a broad, and inconsistently enforced federal gambling law, each state should be
able to determine its own betting regulatory structure. States must be able to make decisions such
as whether citizens should be able to gamble, what types of games or bets should be allowed, how
these bets are placed, and what platforms are given licenses. Sports betting and gambling policy
has almost always been a state-run program, dating back to the 1800s.98 The most prominent
example of a formalized regulatory scheme is Nevada’s passage of the “Wide Open Gambling
Bill” in 1931 when the state legalized commercial gambling.99 Today, all but two states have some
form of legalized gambling.100 However, the approach to gambling policy varies across the United
States. While some states only allow tribal gambling, others have created inter-state compacts with
nearby jurisdictions. Gambling within a state is tied to that population’s public policy, and whether
its citizens believe sports betting and gambling is right for their state. Gambling programs are also
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tied to state taxes and state land use. In the case of state lotteries, the funds are typically used to
fund public programs, like education.101 The federal government has no role in determining these
issues, as many decisions are made on the local level. When states oversee its own gaming
regulations, it is ensured that said rules are tailored to each state’s individual circumstances. The
federal government has proved it is not prepared to regulate Internet gambling and sports betting
and should instead respect state sovereignty.
Supporters of the Wire Act have advocated to allow the Act to continue to control the
industry, arguing that the Act’s quasi-command for states to only accept wagers within its own
state lines retains revenue inside of that state. Abolishing the Act would allow patrons to choose
which state they wanted to bet in, meaning the revenue could be distributed unevenly from state
to state.102 What these advocates fail to recognize, however, is that the Wire Act creates a cap on
the market because patrons are only allowed to use the sports betting platforms that are available
and active in its state, and in some cases platform policies may prevent patrons from using the
available platforms.103 In that situation, the state government would receive no revenue
whatsoever. Additionally, states, not the federal government should be allowed to manage these
concerns by working with surrounding states to make compacts, similar to the compacts made
between Indian tribes and state governments, that could modify restrictions on interstate gaming.
Additionally, states could facilitate joint policy enforcement, shared liquidity, and tax revenue.104
Furthermore, states could also allow sports businesses to engage in multi-jurisdictional risk
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management.105 The Wire Act must be repealed to provide states the ability to determine its own
gambling policy, which adapts to modern technology and ensures tax revenues do not leave its
state.
B. The UIGEA is not a Viable Replacement for the Wire Act
The DOJ’s 2018 Opinion also raised a new consideration in federal regulation of gambling
– the intersection between the Wire Act and the Unlawful Internet Gambling Enforcement Act of
2006 (UIGEA).106 Although the 2018 Opinion ultimately decided that the UIGEA did not alter the
scope of the Wire Act, it is important to understand how the two interact to fully comprehend how
the UIGEA is not a sole, viable alternative to the Wire Act. 107
In 2006, the Security and Accountability for Every Port Act of 2006 (the SAFE Port Act),
a bill focused on ensuring U.S. ports against terrorist threats, had a small, relatively unknown
statute attached to the bill, known as UIGEA.108 Section 5363 of UIGEA states that “[n]o person
engaged in the business of betting or wagering may knowingly accept, in connection with the
participation of another person in unlawful Internet gambling,” the proceeds of any form of
financial transaction.109 Although UIGEA does not directly state that Internet gaming is illegal, it
targets financial institutions by restricting transfers of money to Internet gambling providers.110
UIGEA only makes bets illegal if they are technically unlawful under “any applicable Federal or
State law in the State … in which the bet … is initiated, received, or otherwise made.” 111 So if the
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wager is illegal under the Wire Act, it is also illegal under UIGEA.112 However, there is a critical
difference between the Wire Act and UIGEA.
Under UIGEA, the only location that matters is where the bet was made and received,
regardless of whether it was across state lines or not. 113 Congress likely knew that it was impossible
to ensure that every single wager and that wager’s location did not cross state lines. However, the
allowance of routing wagers across states is technically unlawful under the Wire Act.114 UIGEA
is modern day legislation that does not prohibit gaming activity that crosses state lines, which
makes complete sense when the activity in question is legal in both states, and thus the only illegal
component is the fact that the wager technically “crosses” state lines.
However, UIGEA is not a proper replacement for the Wire Act. Section 5362(2) of the
UIGEA prohibits the acceptance of “an electronic fund transfer, or funds transmitted by or through
a money transmitting business, or the proceeds of an electronic fund transfer or money transmitting
service.”115 In addition to prohibiting the direct acceptance of credit cards for unlawful Internet
gaming, UIGEA also prohibits the acceptance of funds through a third-party intermediary. At the
time UIGEA was passed, this provision seemed to be the most devastating for the illegal gaming
industry.116 Prior to UIGEA, large credit card companies, such as Visa, were successfully creating
computer codes that prohibited a user from using their credit cards for online gaming. 117 As a
result, using a credit card to gamble online became impossible. However, the illegal gaming
adapted, and illegal betting sites soon encouraged its users to place money in a PayPal account to
deposit funds to its site. This was a short lived-lived workaround, and Paypal soon disallowed such
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transactions.118 Illegal sites were again forced to find a new way for betters to transfer funds, and
they did not have to wait for long.119
A new third party intermediary system, Neteller, was on the rise beginning in 2007,
coincidentally a year after UIGEA was passed. 120 Because Neteller was incorporated in the Isle of
Man and not in the United States, it was not covered by UIGEA, yet again illustrating how easily
liability under UIGEA could be avoided. The best the DOJ could do is hope that its investigative
efforts would scare these companies enough to stop accepting these payments. However, the DOJ
did eventually find a way to halt Netellar, but not under UIGEA. On January 15, 2007, Netellar’s
founders were arrested for creating a company that assisted in the transfer of illegal gambling
proceeds from United States citizens. Two days later, on January 17, 2007, Netellar announced it
would stop accepting payments related to illegal gambling. 121
This is only one of the loopholes that undermines UIGEA’s effectiveness.122 As technology
has advanced, alternative payments methods such as Venmo or Cash App, have developed, which
allow patrons to easily deposit money into an “e-wallet” and then transfer that money to an illegal
gaming provider, cutting banks out of the direct participation in the payment process.123
Additionally, because patrons label the payments, they can hide what the payments are for, by
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simply stating the payment is for something unrelated to gambling.124 As a result, these payments
are now controlled by private parties, ensuring that states miss out on its potential taxable income
and preventing meaningful regulation under UIGEA.125 UIGEA is therefore not an effective
alternative to replace the Wire Act. In fact, UIGEA has driven illegal gaming even more
underground, as it is almost impossible to track what payments are being made to illegal sites, as
many times patrons are transferring money to an individual as a way to hide the purpose of the
payment, so to an outsider it seems as though they are paying a friend or family member. These
types of payments are not regulated by UIGEA and are certainly not contemplated by the Wire
Act. To create a comprehensive and successful approach to sports betting, two steps should be
taken. The Wire Act should, first, be repealed and the power to regulate gaming should be given
to the states. Also, because UIGEA is not a viable alternative to the Wire Act, Congress should
amend UIGEA to ensure its effectiveness when applied to modern gaming technology.
C. States’ Role in the Repeal of the Wire Act
Finally, the Wire Act must be repealed to protect states from improper liability under the
statute. At any point, the DOJ could decide to prosecute sportsbook operators, or even force states
to change its regulatory decisions to comply with the DOJ’s 2018 Opinion.
For example, after the 2018 DOJ Opinion, Pennsylvania had to halt its efforts to allow
operators to take advantage of existing equipment and gaming machines in other states. 126 In turn,
Pennsylvania issued its own memorandum to all licensees, instructing them to ensure their
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operations were "entirely intrastate,” which forced many operators to redesign their original plans
to begin sports betting.127
Even during the September 27, 2018, Congressional subcommittee hearing about sports
gaming, Chairman Jim Sensenbrenner’s opening statement laid out several possibilities for
congressional action, one of which was for “Congress to defer to the states and allow them to
legalize and regulate sports gaming business.”128 Later, during his closing statement, he repeated
his call for action when he said that “for Congress to do nothing is the worst possible alternative”
indicating that Congress should address the issue of sports betting head -on, instead of leaving the
Wire Act to regulate the industry.129 Letters like the one from twenty-five State Attorneys General
on June 18, 2021, to U.S. Attorney General Merrick Garland, is a great first step in encouraging
the federal government to take action on the topic of gambling. However, writing a letter and
waiting years for a response that will probably never come is not an appropriate final solution and
states should not stop here.
The reality is that the DOJ could change its opinion about the Wire Act tomorrow,
potentially costing states and sports betting companies millions of dollars. By sitting back and
waiting for either a new interpretation or a new law that could narrow the scope of permissible
betting, states and companies are only doing themselves a disservice. Only when these parties take
a more active role in shaping a clear and concise regulatory scheme or advocating for the transfer
of power to the states, will states and companies be immune against liability. All parties with a
stake in the business must play a more active role to ensure a comprehensive approach to gambling
regulation. The fate of the Wire Act should not be left to Congress or the Supreme Court, and
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instead the power to regulate should be given to the states. States are the best decision-makers to
define if and how to legalize and regulate sports betting. States also have decades of experience
with gambling, which give state legislatures and regulatory agencies an edge with it comes to
crafting new policies.130
IV.

Conclusion
The Wire Act has created confusion among the federal government, Congress, state

governments, sports betting platforms, sports leagues, and even patrons themselves. The Wire
Act was originally passed to stop organized crime’s involvement in operating sportsbooks.
However, gambling has moved away from a system of placing bets via the telegraph and is now
a highly-specialized modern system that allows millions of United States citizens to place a
wager from an app on their smartphone. As a result, the Wire Act is ill-equipped to effectively
regulate sports betting and should be repealed. The movement to almost solely online gambling
shows just how out of touch the Wire Act is with modern-day sports betting technology, and
inconsistent federal interpretations of the Wire Act have only exacerbated the statute’s weakness.
Current federal policy, UIGEA specifically, is not an appropriate replacement for the Wire Act
because it still contains loopholes for third-party money transferring organizations. States should
be given sole power to regulate sports betting within its own boundaries because it is more
reactive and nimbler as to best regulate its own public policy concerns. Due to the above failures,
states should take a more active role in the repeal of the Wire Act, because states and companies
alike are currently open to extreme amounts of liability if the DOJ decides to change its opinion
about the Wire Act once again. Overall, due to exploding nature of the sports betting industry
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and complete lack of comprehensive federal policy, it is time for the Wire Act to retire, and for
states to exert control over the regulation of the gaming industry.
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